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Using Pseudocodewords to
Transmit Information
Nathan Axvig
Abstract
The linear programming decoder will occasionally output fractional-valued sequences that do not correspond
to binary codewords – such outputs are termed nontrivial pseudocodewords. Feldman et al. have demonstrated
that it is precisely the presence of nontrivial pseudocodewords that prevents the linear programming decoder
from attaining maximum-likelihood performance. The purpose of this paper is to cast a positive light onto these
nontrivial pseudocodewords by turning them into beneficial additions to our codebooks. Specifically, we develop a
new modulation scheme, termed insphere modulation, that is capable of reliably transmitting both codewords and
pseudocodewords. The resulting non-binary, non-linear codebooks have higher spectral efficiencies than the binary
linear codes from which they are derived and in some cases have the same or slightly better block error rates. In
deriving our new modulation scheme we present an algorithm capable of computing the insphere of a polyhedral
cone – which loosely speaking is the largest sphere contained within the cone. This result may be of independent
mathematical interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
When simulating a block code, one often repeats the following procedure: generate a codeword, transmit
it over a noisy channel, estimate a codeword that best explains the received vector, and finally compare
the estimated codeword to the original. When the estimated codeword and the transmitted codeword are
identical, we record an overall success for the coding scheme. In the case where the estimated codeword
is not equal to the original codeword, we declare a block error. This paper explores a third option: what
if the estimated codeword is not a codeword at all? What, if anything, can be gained from this?
The third option above is a very real possibility when using certain “modern” decoding algorithms such
as min-sum and linear programming decoding. It has been observed (see, e.g., [2], [6]) that occasionally
these decoders will output sequences that are not codewords at all – such non-codeword outputs are termed
nontrivial pseudocodewords. For an example, consider transmission of a codeword from the binary linear
code given by the null space of the following parity-check matrix over the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channel:
H =


1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1

.
If the received vector yields the vector of log-likelihood ratios
[
0, 0, 0,−1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0]T , then the linear
programming (LP) decoder will return
[
1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
, 1, 0, 0, 1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
]T
as an output. This output vector is clearly
not a binary codeword since it has fractional values. In such a case Feldman et al. [6] suggest that we
declare a block error and move on with our lives.
We henceforth adopt the mindset that any potential output of a decoder can be used to transmit
information across a channel. To this end we construct a new modulation scheme, termed insphere
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modulation, that is capable of reliably transmitting pseudocodewords in conjunction with codewords.
Employing insphere modulation therefore allows for larger codebooks of the same length as the original
binary code, and as a result we see modest gains in both spectral efficiency and information rate. Moreover,
we demonstrate that in some circumstances these gains in throughput can be made without sacrificing
error-correcting performance. In order to compute inspheres for transmitting pseudocodewords, we develop
an algorithm capable of computing the insphere of a polyhedral cone to any degree of accuracy. While
we presently treat this result as a means to an end, it may be of independent mathematical interest.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we review linear programming
decoding and some key results from linear optimization. Section III is dedicated to determining which
vectors are best suited to transmitting linear programming pseudocodewords across the AWGN channel,
and Section IV derives an algorithm for computing the best of these vectors, which in our case turns out
to be the center of the insphere of an appropriately defined polyhedral cone. Section V shows how the
results of Section III can be expanded to greatly increase the size of our codebook. Section VI gives a
detailed example, Section VII contains simulation results, and we conclude in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
To produce vectors suitable for reliably transmitting pseudocodewords, we must go “under the hood”
of the linear programming decoder and its underlying algebra and geometry. The material in this section
is largely adapted from [4], though it can also be found in most introductory texts on linear optimization.
Notationally, we write xT for the transpose of x and ‖x‖ for the usual Euclidean norm of x. Unless stated
otherwise, all vectors are assumed to be column vectors.
A. Background on Linear Programming
A polyhedron in Rn is the set of all points satisfying a finite set of linear equality and inequality
constraints. Since an equality constraint of the form aTx = b can be replaced by the two inequalities
aTx ≤ b and aTx ≥ b, we can equivalently define a polyhedron as the set of all points satisfying a finite
number of linear inequality constraints. Moreover, by multiplying constraints by −1 we may reformulate
any description of a polyhedron in various compact forms involving matrix products such as A1x ≤ b1
or A2x ≥ b2.
If a polyhedron is bounded we refer to it as a polytope. On the other hand, if a polyhedron is closed
under multiplication by non-negative scalars we call it a polyhedral cone. It is an easy exercise to see
that polyhedra are convex sets, i.e., given two points x and y in a polyhedron M and a scalar λ ∈ [0, 1],
the convex combination λx+ (1− λ)y is also in M. If a point ω in a polyhedron M cannot be written
as a convex combination of two different points in M, we say that ω is an extreme point or a vertex of
the polyhedron. Given a point y ∈ Rn and a constraint of the form aTx ≤ b, aTx ≥ b, or aTx = b, we
say that the constraint is active or binding at y provided that the constraint is met with equality, i.e., if
aTy = b.
Given a finite set of vectors V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vℓ} ⊆ Rn and a set of non-negative scalars {w1, w2, . . . , wℓ},
we say that
∑ℓ
i=1wivi is a conic combination of the vectors in V . The polyhedral cone generated by V
is then the set of all conic combinations of vectors in V . It is initially unclear that K(V) is a polyhedron
since it is not explicitly described as the set of all vectors satisfying a finite set of equality and inequality
constraints. A classical approach to affirming this fact is Fourier-Motzkin elimination (see, e.g., [4]), a
technique that produces a complete set of linear equality and inequality constraints for a projection of a
polyhedron onto a subset of its coordinates.
For our purposes we define an optimization problem to be the task of maximizing or minimizing an
objective function over all points in a feasible set. A linear program (LP) is simply an optimization
problem for which the objective function is linear and whose feasible set is a polyhedron. It is well
known that if an optimal solution to a linear program exists, then there is at least one extreme point of
the underlying polyhedron that achieves this optimal value. Conversely, given an extreme point ω of a
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polyhedron M there must exist some linear function c so that ω is the unique minimizer of cTx over all
x ∈M (see, e.g., pages 46-52 of [4]).
B. Background on Linear Programming Decoding
In [6] the linear programming decoder is introduced. This decoder operates by solving a linear program-
ming relaxation of the maximum-likelihood (ML) decoding problem. In particular, the decoder outputs a
solution to the following linear program:
minimize λTx
subject to x ∈ P(H)
where λ is the vector of log-likelihood ratios determined from the channel output and P(H) ⊆ Rn is a
polytope whose constraints are determined by the parity-check matrix H chosen to represent the code.
Definition II.1 ([6]). Let C be a code presented by an m × n parity-check matrix H = (hj,i). For any
row hj of H , define N(hj) to be the set of all indices i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} with hj,i = 1. The fundamental
polytope1 P = P(H) is the set of all vectors x ∈ Rn satisfying the following constraints:
• 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n and
•
∑
i∈S
xi +
∑
i′∈N(hj)\S
(1 − xi′) ≤ |N(hj)| − 1 for all pairs (j, S), where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} and S is a
subset of N(hj) with odd cardinality.
Since the fundamental polytope P(H) is bounded the linear programming decoder will always have an
optimal solution, and by the preceding discussion we can assume that the linear programming decoder
always returns an extreme point of P(H) as its output. As in [3], we define a linear programming (LP)
pseudocodeword to be any extreme point of P(H). In [6], it is shown that all codewords are extreme
points of P(H) and conversely that all integer-valued vectors within P(H) must be codewords. Again
following [3], we therefore refer to codewords as trivial linear programming (LP) pseudocodewords and
any extreme points of P(H) with fractional values as nontrivial linear programming (LP) pseudocode-
words. Since this paper is concerned only with the LP decoder, we will often refer to these simply as
trivial and nontrivial pseudocodewords.
In [6], it is shown that if the linear programming decoder outputs an integer-valued codeword then this
codeword must be a maximum-likelihood codeword. Since the set of codewords and the set of of integer-
valued points in P(H) are identical, this implies that the presence of nontrivial LP pseudocodewords is
precisely what prevents the LP decoder from achieving ML performance. Much research has therefore
been devoted to examining the structure and properties of nontrivial pseudocodewords (see, e.g., [3], [8],
[9], [10], [12], [13], [14]). The authors of [15] go so far as to determine whether for a given code C
there exists a parity-check matrix H for which P (H) contains no nontrivial pseudocodewords – for most
binary linear codes, the answer is “no” [15]. Nontrivial pseudocodewords are ubiquitous, and yet for certain
received vectors they are optimal solutions to the LP decoding problem. Taking the saying “If you can’t
beat them, join them” to heart, we seek a method of incorporating nontrivial pseudocodewords into our
codebooks so as to increase information rates and spectral efficiency without sacrificing error-correcting
performance.
III. HOW TO TRANSMIT A PSEUDOCODEWORD
When transmitting binary values over the additive white Gaussian noise channel it is common to employ
binary phase shift keying (BPSK), which without loss of generality sends a binary 0 to +1 and a binary 1
to −1. As a first (and very naive) attempt at transmitting nontrivial pseudocodewords, we simply extended
this modulation mapping via the affine map x 7→ 1− 2x, added Gaussian noise, and applied LP decoding
1In [6], this is referred to as the projected polytope.
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to the resulting vector. The performance of this modulation scheme was terrible – the block error rate
was consistently close to 1 at all decibel levels. On investigation, we discovered that even when no noise
was added to our modulated vector the LP decoder was unable to recover the original pseudocodeword.
We concluded that to have any hope of transmitting a pseudocodeword a fundamentally new modulation
scheme would be required.
The key observation in deriving our new modulation scheme for the transmission of linear programming
pseudocodewords over the additive white Gaussian noise channel is that every pseudocodeword, trivial
or nontrivial, is an extreme point of the fundamental polytope P(H). By the discussion at the end of
Section II-A, given a pseudocodeword ω ∈ P there must exist a vector of log-likelihood ratios λ so
that ω is the unique solution to the following optimization problem: minimize λTx over all x ∈ P .
We therefore aim to produce a modulated vector that is equal to such a vector of log-likelihood ratios,
since this will ensure that when ω is transmitted in a low-noise scenario the LP decoder will recover the
pseudocodeword ω. Since on the AWGN channel the vector of log-likelihood ratios is proportional to the
received vector, we can simply transmit the vector λ to accomplish this. For this reason we will conflate
the terms “received vector” and “vector of log-likelihood ratios.”
As we prove in Proposition III.1 there are usually infinitely many choices for λ. It is our task to find
a choice that minimizes the probability of block error.
Proposition III.1. Let M = {x |Ax ≥ b} be a polyhedron in Rn, let x∗ ∈ M be given, and define S
to be the set of all indices i where aTi x
∗ = bi - i.e., the index set for all constraints that are active at x
∗.
Consider the problem of minimizing cTx over all x ∈ M: the vector x∗ is an optimal solution to this
problem if and only if cT is a conic combination of the rows of A indexed by S.
Proof. Define AS to be the matrix obtained by only considering those rows of A indexed by S and
suppose that cT is not a conic combination of the rows in AS. This means that there is no vector w
satisfying both cT = wTAS and w ≥ 0. By Farkas’ Lemma (see, e.g., [4]), there must exist a vector d
with ASd ≥ 0 and cTd < 0. Consider now the vector x∗ + θd. Since aTi x∗ > bi for all i 6∈ S, if we
choose θ > 0 to be sufficiently small then x∗ + θd will satisfy A(x∗ + θd) ≥ b and thus be an element
of M. Computing the objective value of this new vector in M, we obtain
cT (x∗ + θd) = cTx∗ + θcTd < cTx∗,
which implies that x∗ cannot be an optimal solution to the minimization problem.
For the other direction, we use a modification of the proof that any basic feasible solution of a linear
program is also a vertex (see, e.g., the discussion on page 52 of [4]). We now reproduce this proof with
appropriate modifications for the sake of completeness. Suppose that cT =
∑
i∈S wia
T
i for some scalars
wi with wi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S. If x is an arbitrary point in M, we have cTx =
∑
i∈S wia
T
i x ≥
∑
i∈S wibi.
The number
∑
i∈S wibi is therefore a lower bound on the objective value for any point in M. But by
the definition of S, we have that aTi x = bi for all i ∈ S. Thus, cTx∗ =
∑
i∈S wia
T
i x
∗ =
∑
i∈S wibi. The
vector x∗ attains this bound and therefore must be an optimal solution to the problem of minimizing cTx
subject to Ax ≥ b.
To apply Proposition III.1 to our coding problem, we make the following definition.
Definition III.2. Let C be a code presented by the parity-check matrix H , let P(H) be the associated
fundamental polytope, and assume that P(H) has been written as P(H) = {x |Ax ≥ b} for an appropriate
matrix A. For any linear programming pseudocodeword ω, the recovery cone Kω(H) = Kω of ω is the
cone generated by all row vectors of A for which the corresponding constraint of P(H) is binding at ω.
Let t(ω) be a point in the recovery cone Kω and let η represent the additive Gaussian noise introduced
by the channel. By Proposition III.1, the nontrivial pseudocodeword ω can be correctly recovered if and
only if the received vector t(ω) + η lies within Kω. If r is the radius of the largest sphere centered at
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t(ω) yet contained completely within Kω, then the probability of correct decoding is bounded below by
the probability that |η| ≤ r.
A trivial way of driving the probability of correct decoding to 1 is simply to scale t(ω) by a large
positive constant, which is tantamount to transmitting with more energy. It is more interesting to place an
energy constraint on the transmitted vector and then search for a vector that maximizes the radius of the
largest sphere centered at that vector and contained within Kω. Stated more formally, we seek to compute
the insphere of Kω. This matter is treated separately in Section IV.
Our approach to computing the insphere of a polyhedral cone depends on having access to an explicit
description of the cone in terms of linearly inequality constraints. While Fourier-Motzkin elimination (see,
e.g., [4]) can produce such a description, it is terribly inefficient: for codes of small block length (n ≤ 20)
Fourier-Motzkin elimination produces the constraint matrix for Kω in a reasonable amount of time (a
few minutes to a few hours on a desktop computer). For longer codes, however, we approximate Kω by
examining a larger cone that contains it.
Definition III.3. Let C be a code presented by the parity-check matrix H , let ω be a linear programming
pseudocodeword, and let Ψ = {ψ1,ψ2, . . . ,ψr} be a set of linear programming pseudocodewords. The
approximation cone Rω,Ψ(H) = Rω,Ψ is defined to be the set of all vectors x satisfying Rω,Ψx ≥ 0,
where the ith row of Rω,Ψ is given by (ψi − ω)T .
Proposition III.4. Let C be a code presented by the parity-check matrix H . If ω is a linear programming
pseudocodeword and Ψ = {ψ1,ψ2, . . . ,ψr} is a set of linear programming pseudocodewords, then the
recovery cone Kω is a subset of the approximation cone Rω,Ψ.
Proof. The inequality (ψi −ω)Ty ≥ 0 describes all cost functions y of the linear programming decoder
for which ω has an objective value that is no larger than that of ψi. By Proposition III.1, it follows that
every vector x ∈ Kω satisfies (ψi − ω)Tx ≥ 0. Intersecting over all i we obtain Kω ⊆ Rω,Ψ.
We can generate an approximation cone for the pseudocodeword ω by repeatedly transmitting a vector
in Kω (say, the sum of all constraint vectors of P(H) that are binding at ω) in a low signal-to-noise
environment and recording the pseudocodewords that arise as the LP decoder’s output. If enough unique
pseudocodewords are found, the insphere of the corresponding approximation cone ought to be a good
approximation of the insphere of the recovery cone – discussion regarding the corresponding block error
rates can be found in Sections VI and VII.
In summary, Proposition III.1 states that any conic combination of constraint vectors that are active at
the pseudocodeword ω can be used to reliably transmit ω. A lower bound for the probability of correctly
recovering ω over the AWGN channel can be maximized by transmitting a vector proportional to the
center of the insphere of the recovery cone. With this in mind, we define insphere modulation as the
method of mapping ω to the center of an appropriate insphere, whether it is the insphere of the recovery
cone or an approximation cone.
IV. A METHOD OF COMPUTING THE INSPHERE OF A POLYHEDRAL CONE
In this section we develop an iterative algorithm capable of approximating the insphere of a polyhedral
cone to any degree of accuracy. While our primary application will be to produce modulated versions
of pseudocodewords that maximize a lower bound on the probability of block error, the results of this
section may be of independent mathematical interest.
Throughout this section, we use Br(x) to denote the closed sphere (or ball) of radius r centered at x,
i.e., Br(x) := {y ∈ Rn | ‖x− y‖ ≤ r}.
Definition IV.1 ([7]). Let K be a polyhedral cone in Rn. The insphere of K is the largest sphere contained
in K whose center is in B1(0), and the inradius of K is the radius of the insphere.
It is a consequence of Theorem 2.4 in [7] that any polyhedral cone with a non-empty topological interior
possesses a unique insphere. Since polyhedral cones with empty interiors are of little use for transmitting
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pseudocodewords, we assume that our polyhedral cone is full dimensional and thus has a unique insphere.
Moreover, we observe that the center of such an insphere will necessarily have unit magnitude.
Throughout this section we will assume that we are in possession of an explicit description of K in
terms of linear inequality constraints Kx ≥ 0. By scaling we can ensure that every row kTi of K has unit
length - as such, kTi x measures the Euclidean distance from the point x to the hyperplane defined by the
ith row of K. Following an idea similar to that employed to find inspheres of two-dimensional polyhedra
given in [11], the insphere can be found by maximizing a lower bound z on the distance from a point
in K ∩ B1(0) to any defining hyperplane. This idea is expressed succinctly by the following nonlinear
convex optimization problem that, for reasons that will soon be become clear, we call Problem P∞.
max z (P∞)
subject to kTi x ≥ z for all i
‖x‖2 ≤ 1
If (x∞, z∞) is an optimal solution to Problem P∞, then x∞ will give the center of the insphere and z∞
will give the inradius.
The special structure of Problem P∞ admits an interesting algorithm that seeks to model the nonlinear
boundary of the constraint ‖x‖2 = ∑ni=1 x2i ≤ 1 by iteratively adding linear inequality constraints. Our
algorithm operates by defining a sequence of linear programming problems and examining the optimal
solutions of each. At each stage, we also derive an upper and lower bounds on the inradius of K. The
primary result of this section is that the sequence of optimal solutions converges to the center of the
insphere. Moreover, the upper and lower bounds on the inradius are easily computable and can be used
to terminate computations once the desired degree of accuracy is attained.
To initialize our algorithm we form a linear program P0 that contains all of the linear constraints of
problem P∞ but eschews the nonlinear constraint in favor of 2n linear constraints that confine potential
solutions to a bounded hypercube. This is done to ensure that an optimal solution to this problem (and
all subsequent problems) exist. Formally, we defined problem P0 as the following linear program:
max z (P0)
subject to kTi x ≥ z for all i
− 1 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for all i
We formulate problem Pℓ+1 based off of problem Pℓ as follows. We first compute an optimal solution
(xℓ, zℓ) to problem Pℓ (such a solution is readily obtained from any LP solver) and then compute the
unit vector uℓ in the direction of xℓ. We note that the optimality of xℓ implies that ‖xℓ‖ ≥ 1, which
among other things implies that xℓ 6= 0 and so uℓ is defined for all ℓ. Next, we record the value
wℓ =
zℓ
‖xℓ‖
= mini{kTi uℓ}, since wℓ is the radius of the largest sphere centered at the unit vector uℓ and
contained within K and thus forms a lower bound on the inradius of K. We define Problem Pℓ+1 by
duplicating Problem Pℓ and requiring that the additional constraint u
T
ℓ x ≤ 1 also be met. The general
form of Problem Pℓ+1 is given as follows:
max z (Pℓ+1)
subject to kTi x ≥ z for all i
− 1 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for all i
uT0 x ≤ 1
...
uTℓ−1x ≤ 1
uTℓ x ≤ 1
6
(a) A cone with a unit circle superimposed. (b) Additional constraints are added to create the
feasible region for Problem P0.
(c) The largest sphere contained in the cone and
centered in Problem P0’s feasible region is found.
(d) A new constraint is added to form the feasible
set of Problem P1.
(e) The largest sphere contained in the cone and
centered in Problem P1’s feasible region is found.
(f) Since x1 lies on the unit circle, the insphere of
the cone has been found.
Fig. 1: An illustration of our iterative method for computing the insphere of a polyhedral cone to any
degree of accuracy. For this small example in R2, the exact insphere is found in only two steps.
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This process of iteratively approximating the insphere of a polyhedral cone is illustrated in Figure 1.
With these definitions one can see that the feasible sets for problems P0, P1, . . . , Pℓ, . . . , P∞ are nested
within each other, forming a descending chain of sets with respect to inclusion. Since all are maximization
problems, it follows that the sequence of zℓ’s is monotonically decreasing. By comparison, the sequence
of wℓ’s has been observed to be generally increasing in nature, though not always monotonically (see
Figure 2). Still, we know from a previous observation that wℓ forms a lower bound on z∞. We obtain
Proposition IV.2 by combining these results.
Proposition IV.2. Let K be a polyhedral cone with non-empty topological interior and let z∞ denote its
inradius. Let (xℓ, zℓ) be an optimal solution to Problem Pℓ, and define wℓ =
zℓ
‖xℓ‖
. With this notation, we
have that
z0 ≥ z1 ≥ · · · ≥ zℓ ≥ · · · ≥ z∞.
Moreover, for any pair of integers m and n we have
zm ≥ z∞ ≥ wn.
Proposition IV.2 states that the inradius always lies between wℓ and zℓ. To compute the inradius to
within δ of its true value, once can compute solutions to these problems until zℓ−wℓ ≤ δ. Computational
results, such as those summarized in Figure 2, suggest that zℓ−wℓ can always be driven to be arbitrarily
small. As we shall see from Theorem IV.4, this is indeed the case. To prove this theorem, we first present
a lemma.
Upper and Lower Bounds on the Inradius
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Fig. 2: A plot of upper bounds zℓ and lower bounds wℓ on the inradius for an approximation cone used
to compute a transmittable version of the pseudocodeword ω3 (see Section VI). The cone is described by
35 constraints in R16. In this example, it takes 56 iterations to ensure that the upper and lower bounds
are within 10−5 of one another.
Lemma IV.3. Let K be a polyhedral cone with non-empty topological interior, let (xℓ, zℓ) be an optimal
solution to Problem Pℓ, and define uℓ =
xℓ
‖xℓ‖
. For any r with 0 ≤ r < ‖xℓ − uℓ‖, Br(xℓ) and the feasible
set for Problem Pℓ+1 are disjoint.
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The proof of Lemma IV.3 is virtually identical to the proof of the separating hyperplane theorem - see,
e.g., pages 170-172 of [4]. This theorem states that given a non-empty, closed convex set S in Rn and a
point x 6∈ S, there exists a hyperplane in Rn for which x is on one side and the entirety of S lies on the
other. Lemma IV.3 merely makes this specific, stating that a small sphere around xℓ can be separated from
uℓ by the inequality u
T
ℓ x ≤ 1, which is precisely the inequality added to Problem Pℓ to form Problem
Pℓ+1.
Theorem IV.4. Let K be a polyhedral cone with non-empty topological interior, and let x∞ and z∞ denote
the center of its insphere and its inradius, respectively. If (xℓ, zℓ) is an optimal solution to Problem Pℓ,
then xℓ converges to x∞ and zℓ converges to z∞.
Proof. Define uℓ :=
xℓ
‖xℓ‖
and suppose for the sake of a contradiction that xℓ−uℓ does not converge to the
zero vector. This implies that there is an infinite subsequence ℓk and some ǫ0 > 0 so that ‖xℓk − uℓk‖ ≥ ǫ0
for all k. Since the feasible sets of all Problems Pℓ are contained within the feasible set for Problem P0,
which is bounded, the sequence xℓk is bounded. The Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem implies that there is
a subsequence xℓkj of xℓk that converges to some vector.
Since xℓkj is a convergent sequence, it must be a Cauchy sequence. Thus, there a J so that for all
j′, j′′ ≥ J we have
∥∥∥xℓk
j′
− xℓk
j′′
∥∥∥ ≤ ǫ0/4. The triangle inequality implies that for all j′ ≥ J the vector
xℓk
j′
is in Bǫ0/2(xℓkJ ). Since
∥∥∥xℓkj − uℓkj
∥∥∥ ≥ ǫ0 for all j, Lemma IV.3 implies that Bǫ0/2(xℓkJ ) is disjoint
from the feasible set of Problem Pℓj′ for all j
′ > J , which implies that xℓkJ+1 is infeasible for Problem
PℓkJ+1 . This is a contradiction, since xℓkJ+1 was taken to be an optimal solution to Problem PℓkJ+1 . We
conclude that xℓ − uℓ converges to the zero vector.
Since xℓ−uℓ converges to the zero vector and the individual sequences xℓ and uℓ are both bounded, we
can conclude that the individual sequences xℓ and uℓ converge to a common limit x
∗, which is necessarily
a unit vector. With wℓ =
zℓ
‖xℓ‖
, the convergence of xℓ and uℓ to a common limit implies that zℓ and wℓ
converge to a common limit, which by Proposition IV.2 must be the inradius of K. This, along with the
uniqueness of the insphere (see Theorem 2.4 in [7]) implies that x∗ = x∞.
V. EXTENDING THE MODULATION SCHEME VIA C-SYMMETRY
Using the results of Sections III and IV, one can obtain a transmitted vector that can reliably recover
a linear programming pseudocodeword. While finding such a vector takes some work, once computed it
can be easily modified to allow for the broadcast of many more pseudocodewords.
In order to show that the probability of block error is independent of the codeword transmitted, the
concept of C-symmetry is introduced in [5]2.
Definition V.1 ([5]). Let C be a code presented by the parity-check matrix H , and let c ∈ C be given.
For any point x ∈ P(H), the relative point xc of x with respect to c is the point whose ith coordinate
is given by |xi − ci| for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Theorem V.2 ([5]). Let C be a code presented by the parity-check matrix H . For any point x ∈ P(H)
and any codeword c ∈ C, the relative point xc is also an element of P(H). Further, if ω is an extreme
point of P(H), then ωc is also an extreme point of P(H).
Given a codeword c ∈ C, define the map ζc : P(H) → P(H) by ζc(x) = xc. Since ζc is an isometry
of Rn, it is also an isometry of P(H). Additionally, the map ζc defines a group action of the code C
(viewed as an abelian group under vector addition) on P(H) as well as on the set of extreme points of
P(H), i.e., the set of LP pseudocodewords.
For a row hj ofH and an odd-sized subset S ofN(hj), let (j, S) denote the constraint of the fundamental
polytope given by
∑
i∈S xi +
∑
i′∈N(hj)\S
(1 − xi′) ≤ |N(hj)| − 1, which we rewrite as −
∑
i∈S xi +
2Though the term “C-symmetry” is never used in [6], the relevant concepts are present there as well.
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∑
i′∈N(hj)\S
xi′ ≥ 1 − |S|. For a codeword c ∈ C, let Sc := S△(supp(c) ∩ N(hj)), where the “△”
operator denotes the symmetric difference of two sets. By following these definitions, one can prove the
following proposition:
Proposition V.3. Let C be a binary code presented by the parity-check matrixH with fundamental polytope
P(H). Let j be the index of a row hj of H and S be an odd-sized subset of N(hj), and let x ∈ P(H)
and c ∈ C be given. If the constraint defined by the pair (j, S) is active at x, then the constraint (j, Sc)
is active at the relative point xc.
Using Proposition V.3, we see that the set of constraint vectors of the fundamental polytope that
are active at ωc can be obtained by first taking the set of constraints vectors that are active at ω and
multiplying each component in the support of c by -1. Moreover, if Ψ = {ψ1,ψ2, . . . ,ψr} is a set of LP
pseudocodewords and Ψc := {ψc1,ψc2, . . . ,ψcr} , then the approximation cone Rωc,Ψc can be obtained by
applying the same transformation to Rω,Ψ. These facts are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition V.4. Let C be a code presented by the parity-check matrix H , let c be a codeword and ω be
a linear programming pseudocodeword, and let Ψ = {ψ1,ψ2, . . . ,ψr} be a set of linear programming
pseudocodewords. The map φc : R
n → Rn defined by xi → (−1)cixi for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n is an isometry
between the recovery cones Kω and Kωc as well as an isometry between the approximation cones Rω,Ψ
and Rωc,Ψc .
Since the probability density function for additive white Gaussian noise with a given power spectral
density is symmetric about any such isometry defined in Proposition V.4, we have the following result.
Theorem V.5. Let C be a code presented by the parity-check matrix H , let c be a codeword and ω be
a linear programming pseudocodeword, and define the map φc : R
n → Rn by xi → (−1)cixi for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. If t(ω) is a vector in the recovery cone Kω suitable for transmitting ω over the additive
white Gaussian noise channel, then φc
(
t(ω)
)
is a vector in Kωc suitable for transmitting ωc. Moreover,
the probability of correctly decoding to ω when t(ω) is transmitted is equal to the probability of correctly
decoding to ωc when φc
(
t(ω)
)
is transmitted.
Theorem V.5 has a practical consequence: once we have found a vector that provides a low probability
of error in recovering the pseudocodeword ω, we can simply apply the map φc to this vector to transmit
another pseudocodeword in ω’s C-symmetric orbit.
VI. A DETAILED EXAMPLE
In this section we provide a detailed example of a code, the orbits of its pseudocodewords, the modulated
vectors used to transmit these pseudocodewords, and the probability of block error when using said vectors.
We use a cycle code because a complete characterization of their linear programming pseudocodewords
is given in [1], which allows for easy access to a pool of known pseudocodewords.
Definition VI.1. A cycle code is a binary linear code C equipped with a parity-check matrix H with a
uniform column weight of 2.
Given a parity-check matrix H of a cycle code, one can view H as the vertex-edge incidence matrix
of a graph, the so-called normal graph N of the code. It is an easy exercise to show that a binary vector
c is in the null space of H if and only if the support of c indexes an edge-disjoint union of cycles in N .
For our example, we will consider the cycle code C1 of length 16 and dimension 5 presented as the null
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x1 = 0 x2 = 1 x3 = 0
x4 = 0
x5 = 1 x6 = 1
x7 = 0
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Fig. 3: The normal graph N1 corresponding to the parity-check matrix H1. The edges corresponding to
the support of the codeword c = [0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0]T are given in bold to emphasize
the correspondence between edge-disjoint unions of cycles in the normal graph and codewords.
space of the parity-check matrix
H1 =


1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1


.
When viewed as the vertex-edge incidence matrix for a graph N1 with vertices u1, u2, . . . , u12 and edges
x1, x2, . . . , x16, we obtain the normal graph N1 in Figure 3.
As mentioned before, cycle codes derive their name from the bijective correspondence between binary
codewords and edge-disjoint unions of cycles in the normal graph. In [1], a graph-based characterization
of both trivial and nontrivial LP pseudocodewords for cycle codes is given.
Theorem VI.2 ([1]). Let C be a cycle code of length n presented by the parity-check matrix H , and let
P and N denote its fundamental polytope and normal graph, respectively. A vector x ∈ P is a linear
programming pseudocodeword of P if and only if the following three conditions hold:
(a) x ∈ {0, 1
2
, 1}n.
(b) With Hx defined to be {i | xi = 12}, the subgraph Γ of N induced by the edges corresponding to the
indices in Hx is 2-regular. Equivalently, Γ is a union of vertex-disjoint simple cycles γ1, γ2, . . . , γℓ.
(c) With Uoγi defined as set of vertices in γi that are incident with an odd number of edges assigned a
value of 1 by x, the cardinality of Uoγi is itself odd for all simple cycles γi in Γ.
Using Theorem VI.2, one can see that the vector ω1 given by
ω1 =
[
1
2
1 1 1
2
1
2
0 1 0 1 0 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
]T
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Fig. 4: A graphical representation of the pseudocodeword ω1.
must be a linear programming pseudocodeword - Figure 4 gives a graphical representation. We note
that, loosely speaking, ω1 consists of a pair of cycles along with a path linking these cycles. The edges
on the cycles are all labeled with 1
2
, and those on the path between the cycles carry a value of 1. A
similar structure holds for all other pseudocodewords of cycle codes, and this structure is exploited by the
cycle-path method of [1], allowing for the explicit construction of LP pseudocodewords for cycle codes.
We now turn our attention to the task of modulating pseudocodewords; that is, mapping them to
vectors suitable for transmission. Unless stated otherwise the terms “modulated vector” and “modulated
pseudocodeword” are taken to mean the center of an insphere for an appropriately chosen approximation
cone.
The modulated vector t(ω1) suitable for transmitting ω1 across the additive white Gaussian noise
channel was found by a randomized, iterative procedure. The set of pseudocodewords Ψ1 was initialized
as the empty set and the vector f1 was set to be a conic combination of constraint vectors of P that were
active at ω1. From here, each iteration consisted of the following steps. Gaussian noise was repeatedly
added to fi and the resulting vectors were fed into the LP decoder. The pseudocodewords obtained as
output vectors were recorded, and the unique polyhedral neighbors3 of ω1 were added to the set Ψi.
Following the algorithm outlined in Section IV, the inradius of Rω1,Ψi was computed to within 10−5. The
conic combination fi+1 of constraints used for the next iteration was then updated to be the center of the
insphere of Rω1,Ψi , and the set of pseudocodewords Ψi+1 was initialized at Ψi.
Below is the center of the insphere for Rω1,Ψ10 , recorded to two decimal places for ease of viewing:
t(ω1) = [0 −0.35 −0.25 0 0 0.35 −0.26 0.35 −0.35 0.26 0.35 0 0 0.26 0.35 0]
T .
The corresponding inradius was 0.49; however, we note that since this is the inradius of an approximation
cone and not that of the true recovery cone it only serves to provide an upper bound on the true inradius.
We may therefore use such inradii only as rough gauges of error-correcting performance. For a concrete
measure we rely on simulations (see Section VII).
3The pseudocodeword ψ is a polyhedral neighbor of ω1 if both ψ and ω1 comprise the two end points of one of the fundamental
polytope’s edges. This occurs precisely when the rank of constraint vectors that are active at both vectors is one less than the dimension of
the ambient space. We restricted our sets Ψi to such neighboring pseudocodewords since they are the most likely erroneous outputs of the
LP decoder in low-noise scenarios.
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Following Section V, we can now apply C-symmetry to ω1 to obtain additional pseudocodewords as
well as to t(ω1) to obtain modulated versions of these pseudocodewords. Using C-symmetry about the
codeword c of Figure 3 we obtain
ωc1 =
[
1
2
0 1 1
2
1
2
1 1 1 0 0 1 1
2
1
2
0 1 1
2
]T
and
t(ωc1) = [0 0.35 −0.25 0 0 −0.35 −0.26 −0.35 0.35 0.26 −0.35 0 0 0.26 −0.35 0]
T .
There are more pseudocodewords in the C-symmetry orbit of ω1; however, there are only 23 = 8 in total.
This can be seen by observing that the operation of C symmetry will never affect any coordinate of a
pseudocodeword which is assigned a value of 1
2
. Since the locations where ω1 is equal to
1
2
consists of
two vertex disjoint cycles in the normal graph we can conclude that ω1’s stabilizer subgroup has size
22 = 4 and thus its orbit has size 25/22 = 8.
Applying Theorem VI.2 and the cycle-path method of [1], we see that the linear programming pseu-
docodewords of this cycle code can be partitioned into 8 disjoint orbits under C symmetry: 7 orbits of
nontrivial pseudocodewords and a separate orbit for the binary codewords. A set of representatives for
these orbits is given as follows:
ω1 =
[
1
2
1 1 1
2
1
2
0 1 0 1 0 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
]T
ω2 =
[
1 1 1
2
1 0 1
2
1
2
1 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
0 0
]T
ω3 =
[
1
2
1 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
]T
ω4 =
[
1
2
0 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 1 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
0 0
]T
ω5 =
[
0 0 1
2
0 0 1
2
1
2
0 1 0 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
]T
ω6 =
[
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 1
2
]T
ω7 =
[
1
2
1 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 1
2
]T
ω8 =
[
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
]T
.
The sizes of these orbits are 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 2, and 32, respectively, making for a total of 82 pseudocode-
words.
Modulated versions of ω2,ω3, . . . ,ω8 were found in a fashion similar to that described above for ω1.
The inradii of the corresponding approximation cones were 0.49, 0.43, 0.43, 0.43, 0.43, 0.32, and 0.50,
respectively – the apparent multiplicity of some of these inradii is due to the rotational symmetry of the
normal graph. It is interesting to note that the modulated version of ω8, which is simply the all-zeros
codeword, is not proportional to the vector of all ones, which is the vector used to transmit the all-zeros
codeword under BPSK modulation. To two decimal places, we have
t(ω8) = [0.27 0.04 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.04 0.04 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.04 0.28]
T .
With respect to the approximation cone used to produce t(ω8), the radius of the largest sphere centered
at t(ω8) and contained within the approximation cone was 0.50. The radius of the largest sphere centered
at the unit vector in the direction of the BPSK vector and contained within the same approximation cone
was only 0.43, which suggests that the use of t(ω8) will result in a lower block error rate than traditional
BPSK modulation. This suspicion is confirmed by the simulation results displayed in Figure 5.
Figure 5 reveals some interesting facts. Most basically, pseudocodewords can be reliably recovered
when insphere modulation is used for transmission. Second, pseudocodewords in different C-symmetry
orbits display a wide range of error-correcting ability: ω7 has terrible block error rates, while ω1’s error
rates are very close to the error rates provided by BPSK modulation for codewords. Finally, for low levels
of noise we note that using insphere modulation for codewords results in slightly lower error rates than
BPSK modulation. As we will see in Section VII, it is often the case where codewords themselves can
benefit by exchanging BPSK modulation for insphere modulation.
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Fig. 5: A comparison of block error rates when transmitting the all-zeros codeword, ω1,ω3, and ω7 with
insphere modulation. Also included is the block error rate of the all-zeros codeword under traditional
BPSK modulation. The horizontal axis measures the standard deviation of the additive white Gaussian
noise.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In Section V we saw how C-symmetry can be leveraged to produce a codebook that is larger than the
original binary code but still has the same length (i.e., the same number of real dimensions needed for
its signal constellation), and a specific example was given in Section VI in which a cycle code of size 32
could be extended to a codebook consisting of as many as 82 different messages. This increase in spectral
efficiency must be weighed against the potential loss of error-correcting performance. For the simulations
in this section, we are concerned only with the probability of a block error.
We begin with some notation. Let C be a code presented by a parity-check matrixH , and letO1,O2, . . . ,Om
denote m mutually disjoint orbits of LP pseudocodewords (trivial or nontrivial) under C-symmetry.
Suppose we wish to transmit information across the AWGN channel using the codebook M = ∪mi=1Oi.
By Theorem V.5, we may assume that for a fixed noise level the probability of block error will be
uniform across each orbit Oi – we denote this probability by pi. It is of the utmost importance to observe
that pi is completely independent of the other orbits comprising the codebook M. Indeed, under LP
decoding all points in the fundamental polytope, and thus all LP pseudocodewords, are made available
as potential explanations of the received vector regardless of whether these points were included in the
codebook M. Because of this independence, if we assume a uniform distribution on the M =∑mi=1 |Oi|
pseudocodewords from M we then have that the probability of block error is p = 1
M
∑m
i=1 |Oi|pi.
This formula for the overall probability of block error gives great flexibility to the researcher when
searching through possible codebooks. First, we choose a set of linear programming pseudocodewords
ω1, . . . ,ωm from distinct C-symmetry orbits and then compute modulated versions for each (see Sec-
tions III and IV). For each pseudocodeword chosen we simulate transmission across an additive white
Gaussian noise channel, taking care to ensure that all modulated vectors have unit energy and that the
same level of Gaussian noise is added to every pseudocodeword. Once simulation results are obtained,
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Fig. 6: A comparison of block error rates for four codebook/modulation pairs, all of which were derived
from the cycle code C1 of Section VI.
we have approximations of all pi’s. From here we can chose any collection of the m mutually disjoint
orbits represented by ω1, . . . ,ωm to combine into an overall codebook whose probability of error is given
above. The corresponding signal-to-noise ratios are computed according to the formula Eb
N0
= 1
2 log2(M)σ
2 ,
where M is the size of the overall codebook and σ2 the variance of the Gaussian noise added to the
transmitted pseudocodewords.
A. The cycle code C1
For our first round of simulations we use the cycle code C1 from Section VI. In Figure 6 we compare
the performance of four codebook/modulation schemes. Two of these use only the set of 32 codewords,
but differ in that one utilizes BPSK modulation while the other employs insphere modulation. The third
scheme’s codebook is comprised of all 32 codewords in addition to the 48 nontrivial pseudocodewords
in the C-symmetric orbits of ω1,ω2, . . . ,ω6, making for an overall codebook of size 80 (all vectors in
this codebook were modulated using insphere modulation). The final combination listed is the codebook
consisting only of the 48 nontrivial pseudocodewords in the C-symmetric orbits of ω1,ω2, . . . ,ω6 – no
binary codewords whatsoever4.
We can make several observations from Figure 6. First, we see that insphere modulation enjoys a modest
coding gain over BPSK modulation when it comes to transmitting codewords. Second, we see that when
pseudocodewords are broadcast in conjunction with codewords, it is possible to attain error rates better
than those of codewords alone under BPSK modulation. Moreover, these better error rates are coupled
with a higher spectral efficiency: the coding scheme consisting of codewords and the C-symmetric orbits
of ω1,ω2, . . . ,ω6 has a spectral efficiency of log2(80)/16 = 0.3951, whereas the spectral efficiency of
the codebooks using only binary codewords is 0.3125. The spectral efficiency of the codebook consisting
only of the union of the C-symmetry orbits of ω1,ω2, . . . ,ω6 is log2(48)/16 = .3491, thus landing this
4The two pseudocodewords in the orbit of ω7 were not used due to their relatively poor block error rates (see Figure 5).
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codebook in a bit of gray area: when compared to codewords under BPSK modulation, it is slightly better
with respect to spectral efficiency yet slightly worse with respect to block error rate.
B. The cycle code C2
A second [20, 7] cycle code C2 was also investigated. The parity-check matrix chosen for C2 corresponds
to the normal graph shown in Figure 7. Using Theorem VI.2 and the cycle-path method of [1] one can
show that this code possesses a total of 2,376 pseudocodewords: 128 binary codewords,
(
8
4
)
= 70 disjoint
C-symmetry orbits consisting of 25 = 32 nontrivial pseudocodewords each, and a final orbit consisting
of 23 = 8 nontrivial pseudocodewords. It is therefore possible to construct a coding scheme from this
code that possesses a spectral efficiency of log2(2376)/20 = 0.5607, a fair bit higher than 0.35, the
spectral efficiency of the original binary code. Many of these non-trivial pseudocodewords, however, have
approximation cones with small inradii, which would drive the block error rates of a coding scheme
using all 2,376 pseudocodewords to unacceptably high levels. The task at hand, and indeed for any
coding scheme we try to extend by using LP pseudocodewords, is to determine which of these non-trivial
pseudocodewords enjoy a performance advantage over binary codewords under BPSK modulation.
x1
x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
x7
x8
x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14
x15
x16 x17 x18 x19 x20
Fig. 7: The normal graph corresponding to the [20, 7] cycle code C2.
Many pseudocodewords were examined, and we present results on the following three for illustration:
ωA =
[
1
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
2
1
2
1
2
0 0 0 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 0 0 0
]T
ωB =
[
1
2
1 1 1 1
2
0 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
1
2
0 0 0 0 0 1
2
0
]T
ωC =
[
0 1
2
1
2
1 1
2
1
2
0 0 1
2
0 1
2
1
2
0 1
2
0 1
2
1
2
0 1
2
1
2
]T
.
Modulated versions of these pseudocodewords as well as for the all-zeros codeword were found in a
manner similar to that outlined for C1 in Section VI, with the inradius of each approximation cone
computed to within 10−5. To two decimal places, the inradii for ωA,ωB,ωC , and the all-zeros codeword
were 0.46, 0.39, 0.21, and 0.45, respectively. The radius of the largest sphere centered at the unit vector
in the direction of the vector used to transmit the all-zeros codewords under BPSK modulation and
contained within the approximation cone developed for the all-zeros codeword was only 0.39. These
inradii suggest that ωA will achieve the best error rates, followed by codewords broadcast with insphere
modulation, a near-tie between ωB and the all-zeros codeword under BPSK modulation, and finally ωC .
These predictions based on inradii of approximation cones are only partly born out in simulation - see
Figure 8. Still, it is interesting to observe that insphere modulation of the all-zeros codeword as well as
of ωA beat out BPSK modulation at moderate to low levels of Gaussian noise.
We present various coding schemes based off of C2 and its pseudocodewords in Figure 9. The spec-
tral efficiencies of the both schemes utilizing only codewords is 0.35. The spectral efficiency of the
scheme whose codebook consists of both codewords as well as pseudocodewords in the orbit of ωA is
log2(128 + 32)/20 = 0.3661, while that of the scheme whose codebook consists of codewords as well
as pseudocodewords in the orbits of ωA and ωB is log2(128 + 32 + 32)/20 = 0.3792. All of the coding
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Fig. 8: A comparison of block error rates when transmitting the all-zeros codeword, ωA,ωB, and ωC
with insphere modulation. Also included is the block error rate of the all-zeros codeword under traditional
BPSK modulation. The horizontal axis measures the standard deviation of the additive white Gaussian
noise.
schemes utilizing insphere modulation have spectral efficiencies that meet or exceed that of the traditional
BPSK modulation, and they do so while performing better with respect to block error rate (see Figure 9).
It is also interesting that the coding scheme consisting of codewords as well as pseudocodewords in the
orbit of ωA performs slightly better than codewords under insphere modulation while also enjoying a
higher spectral efficiency. This is encouraging, for it gives us hope that incorporating pseudocodewords
into coding schema may be able to produce results that extend beyond those obtained by simply optimizing
the manner in which we transmit binary codewords.
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C. A Randomly Generated [30, 10] Code
In order to branch out from cycle codes we randomly generated a [30, 10] code C3 with the following
parity-check matrix:
H3 =


0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1


.
Pseudocodewords for this code/parity-check matrix combination were generated via a random search. The
two we highlight are given below:
ωD = [0 1 0 0
1
3
0 1
2
3
0 0
1
3
1
3
0 1
1
3
1
3
1 0 0 1 1
1
3
1 1
2
3
2
3
1 1 1 1]T
ωE = [1
4
5
0 1 0 1 0
3
5
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1
5
3
5
3
5
3
5
0 1
1
5
1 1
1
5
0
1
5
1 1]T .
Since neither ωD nor ωE contains any fractional entries equal to
1
2
, each has a C-symmetry orbit of
the same size as the binary code itself. The codebooks that included these nontrivial pseudocodewords,
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however, all had much higher error rates than the binary codewords. Figure 10 shows the performance of
ωD and ωE as compared to the performance of the all-zeros codeword under both BPSK and insphere
modulation. The inradii of the approximation cones used to produce transmittable versions of ωD and
ωE were 0.24 and 0.20, respectively. The corresponding inradii for the all-zeros codeword under insphere
modulation was, by comparison, 0.43. The gap between these numbers is likely the reason for the marked
difference in block error rates observed in Figure 10. Since none of the nontrivial pseudocodewords we
found came close to matching the performance of codewords, we were unable to increase the spectral
efficiency of this coding scheme without greatly sacrificing performance - see Figure 11.
As mentioned before, the inradius of the approximation cone used to produce a transmittable version of
the all-zeros codeword was 0.43. The largest sphere contained within this same cone but centered at the
unit vector in the direction of the BPSK vector was only 0.26. This suggests that insphere modulation of
codewords should display lower block error rates than those of codewords under BPSK modulation. As
we see in Figure 10, this is indeed the case. A potential explanation of this improvement in performance
is that insphere modulation gives a method of identifying individual bit locations that are particularly
susceptible to errors and “boosting” them, while in turn lowering the energy used to transmit other bits to
balance things out. For instance, we note that C3 has a codeword of Hamming weight 2 whose support lies
only in the first and tenth positions. The unit vector used to transmit the all-zeros vector under insphere
modulation assigns values of 0.3048 and 0.3065 to the first and tenth positions, respectively. These values
are significantly larger than 1/
√
30 = 0.1826, which is the value that the unit vector in the direction of
the BPSK vector assigns uniformly to all positions.
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Fig. 10: A comparison of block error rates for the randomly generated [30, 10] code when transmitting
the all-zeros codeword and two nontrivial pseudocodewords ωD and ωE with insphere modulation. Also
included is the block error rate of the all-zeros codeword under traditional BPSK modulation. The
horizontal axis measures the standard deviation of the additive white Gaussian noise.
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Fig. 11: A comparison of block error rates for four codebook/modulation pairs derived from the code C3.
Insphere modulation is used for all elements of a codebook unless explicitly noted otherwise.
D. A Randomly Generated [30, 17] Code
In the past three examples, insphere modulation applied to codewards has always outperformed binary
phase shift keying at higher signal-to-noise ratios. In this section, we give a cautionary example to
demonstrate that this is not always the case.
Consider the [30, 17] code C4 presented by the following parity-check matrix:
H4 =


1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1


.
All pseudocodewords tested for this code performed abysmally - the best was still giving block error rates
above 0.1 at 8.5 decibels. Moreover, as we can see in Figure 12 the performance of insphere modulation
and BPSK modulation were virtually identical. Thus, no real gains in either spectral efficiency or block
error rate can be gained by using insphere modulation in conjunction with this code.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have defined insphere modulation, a modulation scheme that is suitable for transmitting
nontrivial linear programming pseudocodewords in addition to binary codewords. In doing so, we have
developed a method for approximating the insphere of a polyhedral cone to any degree of accuracy. Sim-
ulation results confirm that certain codebooks utilizing a combination of nontrivial LP pseudocodewords
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Fig. 12: A comparison of block error rates for the randomly generated [30, 17] code under both BPSK
and insphere modulation.
in conjunction with codewords give modest gains in spectral efficiency without sacrificing error correcting
performance. While originally introduced as a means to transmit nontrivial pseudocodewords, insphere
modulation can in some instances be used to lower the block error rates of binary codewords relative to
their performance under traditional BPSK modulation.
It is the author’s belief that the characterization of linear programming pseudocodewords for cycle
codes of [1] makes it easier for the researcher to search through the vast number of pseudocodewords and
possibly stumble upon some that can be beneficial. A broader characterization of LP pseudocodewords
for general binary codes, should it exist, may prove useful in determining the overall efficacy of using
hybrid codebooks comprised of both binary codewords and nontrivial pseudocodewords.
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